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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BUSCH CORPORATION, dba BUSCH
DEVELOPMENT, INC., and QUAILBROOK CONDOMINIUM COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 19859

STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY
COMPANY and ROYAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants and Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiff and appellant for liability insurance coverage under policies issued by State Farm Fire &
Casualty Company and Royal Insurance Company.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable Dean E. Conder of the Third Judicial
District Court granted defendant State Farm Fire & Casualty
Company's Motion to Dismiss and granted defendant Royal Insurance
Company's Motion for Summary Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant and respondent Royal Insurance Company seeks
affirmance of the summary judgment entered in its favor by the
lower court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant/respondent Royal Insurance Company issued a
business comprehensive liability policy to the named insured
Busch Development, Inc. for the period from February 15, 1978 to
February 15, 1979.

(Record p. 76)

An endorsement to the policy

added additional named insureds, including "Busch-Quailbrook, a
Ltd. Partnership11 as a named insured.

(Record p. 78)

The written policy as issued contained a written
"Conditions" section requiring full compliance with all terms of
the policy as a condition precedent to suit against the company:
4. Insuredfs Duties in the Event of
Occurrence, Claim or Suit.
(a) In the event of an occurrence, written notice containing particulars sufficient to identify the Insured and also
reasonably obtainable information with
respect to the time, place and circumstances
thereof, and the names, and addresses of the
injured and of available witnesses, shall
be given by or for the Insured to the company or any of its authorized agents as
soon as practicable.
(b) If claim is made or suit is brought
against the Insured, the Insured shall
immediately forward to the company, every
demand, notice, summons or other process
received by him or his representative.
(c) The Insured shall cooperate with the
company and, upon the company's request,
assist in making settlements in the conduct
of suits and in enforcing any right of
contribution or indemnity against any person
or organization who may be liable to the
Insured because of injury or damage with
respect to which insurance is afforded
under this policy; and the Insured shall
attend hearings and trials and assist in
securing and giving evidence and obtaining
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the attendance of witnesses. The Insured
shall not, except at his own cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any obligation or incur any expense other than for
first aid to others at the time of
accident.
5.

Action Against Company.

(a) No action shall lie against the
company unless, as a condition precedent
thereto, there shall have been full
compliance with all of the terms of this
policy, nor until the amount of the
Insured's obligation to pay shall have been
finally determined either by judgment
against the Insured after actual trial or
by written agreement of the Insured, the
claimant and the company. [Emphasis added]
In September, 1980, Busch Development, Inc. and Busch
Corporation were sued in an action entitled Earl Phillip Morgan,
et al., v. Busch Development, Inc., a corporation, and Busch
Corp., a corporation, Civil No. C-80-6884 in the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County (hereinafter, the "prior
lawsuit11)

(Record p. 22). Plaintiffs alleged that defendants

constructed a subdivision known as "Quailbrook East" in 1978, and
designed and constructed the subdivision to allow surface water
to discharge improperly onto the property of Ilr. Morgan, et al.
Defendants hired counsel who undertook their defense.

Defense

counsel moved to dismiss plaintiffs1 complaint on grounds that
neither Busch Development, Inc. nor Busch Corporation owned any
interest in Quailbrook East or constructed any improvements on
that project.

On stipulation, an entity entitled Quailbrook

Condominium Company was substituted as defendant.

The case pro-

ceeded through discovery and to trial, and plaintiffs were
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awarded judgment against Quailbrook Condominium Company for
$29,000 plus costs, on Hay 19, 1982.

In July, 1982, Quailbrook

Condominium Company filed its appeal from the adverse judgment,
which is currently pending before this court, No. 18623.
Royal Insurance Companyfs first notice of any of these
matters was by letter dated February 1, 1983, from a representative of Busch Development, Inc. (Affidavit of Dennis Foster, p.
2).
This notice came five years after the alleged occurrence
began; over two years after the prior lawsuit was filed; and over
six months after the district court entered judgment and appeal
was commenced.

It is undisputed on the record that prior to

February 1, 1983, Royal Insurance had no opportunity to investigate the circumstances surrounding the claims in the prior
lawsuit, nor to attempt to adjust or settle the prior lawsuit,
nor to employ its own counsel to defend the action.

Appellants

have offered no excuse or explanation for their late notice.
The instant action was filed in September, 1983, seeking
indemnification for the judgment entered in the prior lawsuit and
for attorney's fees expended in defending and appealing that
action.
Royal Insurance Company filed its motion for summary
judgment under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, supported
by the affidavit of Dennis Foster, its Salt Lake claims manager,
setting forth the material facts as stated above.

Plaintiffs

filed no affidavit or other form of sworn testimony in opposition
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to the motion.

The court, Honorable Dean E. Conder, entered sum-

mary judgment in favor of Royal Insurance on Itarch 8, 1984
(Record pp. 107-108).
ARGUMENT
The district court was correct in granting the motion
for summary judgment based on the record before it, for the
reasons that (1) no notice was given of the alleged occurrence or
the prior lawsuit at any material time; and (2) Quailbrook
Condominium Company was not a named insured under the policy.
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
The summary judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
This court in Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d
624 (1960), stated:
[Wjhere the moving party's evidentiary
material is in itself sufficient and the
opposing party fails to proffer any evidentiary matter when he is presumably in a
position to do so, the courts should be
justified in concluding that no genuine
issue of fact is present, nor would one be
present at trial. J[d. at 269, 351 P.2d at
637.
Under this rule, the district court's decision to grant
Royal's motion for summary judgment was correct.

This respondent

presented uncontradicted evidence that appellant gave no timely
notice to it of the alleged damage to the property adjoining its
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development or of the lawsuit arising out of that damage.
Appellant proffered no excuse for its delay in giving notice.
Furthermore, respondent introduced uncontroverted evidence that
the entity Quailbrook Condominium Company was not a named insured
under its policy, and that Busch Corporation, defendant in the
prior action, was substituted out of that lawsuit and is not
liable for the judgment entered therein.
The trial court was correct in holding that on the
undisputed material facts, reasonable minds could not differ that
appellant breached the terms of its insurance contract with
respondent and that Quailbrook Condominium Company has no right
to indemnification under that contract.
POINT I.
APPELLANT'S BREACH OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE
INSURANCE CONTRACT RELIEVED ROYAL INSURANCE
COMPANY FROM ITS OBLIGATION UNDER THE
CONTRACT.
Although there is no Utah decision directly on point,
the most persuasive authorities from neighboring jurisdictions,
as well as the best reasoned commentaries on the subject, are
persuasive that under the facts of this case, appellant breached
the insurance contract as a matter of law and respondent is not
obliged to show actual prejudice to it as a result.
This position has been adopted by the leading cases in
the jurisdictions of Idaho, Washington, Nevada, Oregon and
Colorado.
Viani v. Aetna Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 22, 501 P.2d 706

(1972), was cited by appellant in its opening brief for the
analysis of various approaches to the general topic of possible
defenses by an insurance carrier based on failure of cooperation
or notice by the insured.

However, appellant fails to point out

that the express holding of the Idaho Supreme Court in the Viani
case was that the question of prejudice to the insurer was immaterial where the insured failed to perform the condition precedent of giving notice of the suit and forwarding summons and
complaint within a reasonable time.
In that case, the insured failed to give notice of his
potential liability or notice of the lawsuit filed against him
until after final judgment was entered against him.
offered no excuse for the late notice.

The insured

The Idaho Supreme Court

noted substantial authority in other jurisdictions for its position.

Ld. at 713, note 5.
The court recognized certain legitimate business

interests of the insurance carrier which are protected by this
rule:

The carrier is entitled to some degree of control over the

litigation, or where there are multiple insurers, to refuse to
accept defense of the action.

It is entitled to independently

review settlement offers or make its own settlement offers.

It

is entitled to see that crucial issues which could affect its
eventual liability are tried and all relevant matters examined.
The court observed that this rule is not unduly harsh.
The insured still has the opportunity to offer an excuse for its
noncompliance or to prove that it substantially performed
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according to the notice requirement.

On the other hand, this

rule recognizes the legitimate rights of insurers.
The Idaho court also based its decision on a statute
governing insurance contract interpretation and construction
identical to Utah's statute.

The Idaho Code §41-1822 requirement

that "every insurance contract shall be construed according to
the entirety of its terms and conditions as set forth in the
policy . . ."

aided the court in finding that a clear interpre-

tation of the policy at issue would require notice as required by
the policy.

Utah Code §31-19-36 contains identical language, and

compels the same result in the instant case.

As the Idaho

Supreme Court observed, this rule "not only recognizes the legitimate business interests of insurers but also recognizes and
gives effect to, the express provisions of the insurance contract
which we are admonished to do by statute.11

501 P.2d at 714

[emphasis added].
Washington has adopted this same approach.

In Sears,

Roebuck & Company v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 313 P.2d
347 (Wash. 1957), the insured waited 14 months to forward notice
of a claim against it to its insurer.
before trial.

Notice arrived one week

In a subsequent action against the insurer for

indemnification, the Washington Supreme Court held that depriving
an insurer of the right to protect itself against liability in a
prior suit against its insured automatically constituted prejudice.

The court stated:
To be deprived of that right constitutes
prejudice, however imponderable the damages,
-8-

and however efficient and competent
the attorneys retained by the insured . . .
Our view is that in this case it was
immaterial whether Hartford was prejudiced
or not. Ld. at 353.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. v. Cassinelli, 216
P.2d 606 (Nev. 1950), the insurance policy contained notice
requirements identical to those in the Royal policy.

The

insured was involved in an accident on November 23, 1945. A
complaint was served on the insured on September 19, 1946.

Four

months later and 35 days before trial, the insured notified its
insurer.

The Supreme Court of Nevada held:
[W]e find the authorities overwhelmingly in
favor of giving full recognition to such
[notice] provision, in which case the presence or absence of prejudice resulting
from a delay in giving notice becomes
immaterial. I_d. at 615.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that a four-month delay in

giving notice was, under the circumstances, unreasonable.

The

court found that a change in this long-standing rule should be
made by the legislature, if at all.

The court observed that a

decision that would inevitably lead to an increase in insurance
risks and to a necessity for higher rates was one that should be
deferred to the state legislature.

Ld. at 616.

In Bonney v. Jones, 439 P.2d 881 (Ore. 1968), the
insured mistakenly believed that no claim would be filed against
him because the person he injured was covered under Workmen's
Compensation.

When a third-party claim was filed against the

insured on the eve of the running of the statute of limitations,
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he notified his insurer.

The Oregon Supreme Court held that the

insurer was not liable, without requiring a showing of prejudice.
The court stated:
We have also indicated by way of dictum
that the insurer is not required to prove
that it has been prejudiced by the failure
to give notice in such cases. I_d. at 882.
In Wetzbarger v. Eisen, 475 P.2d 637 (Colo. 1970), an
insured gave no notice to his insurer that suit had been filed
against him until a year after the papers were served.

Even

though the insurer had received notice of the accident, the court
held that late notice of the suit rendered the insurance policy
null and void and that the insurer had no burden of proving prejudice as a result of the delay:
[A] policy of insurance is a contract and
failure to give proper notice is a breach
of a condition precedent which relieves the
insurer of any liability under the policy.
Id. at 640.
In the instant case, Royal Insurance received no notice
of the alleged occurrence giving rise to liability, had no opportunity to investigate the events, was denied an opportunity to
participate in the prior lawsuit, and learned of the claim
against its insured only after the prior action was tried to a
judgment and appealed.

Appellant itself has breached a condition

precedent of its contract with Royal.

Breach of a material term

of an insurance policy by an insured and the resulting denial of
the insurerfs rights under the policy to the extent shown by the
facts in this case, clearly demonstrate that appellant should be
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denied recovery on the insurance contract as a matter of law.
Although there are no Utah cases on point, the above
rule is supported by consistent reasoning in a case decided under
a rule distinguished by the Utah Supreme Court from situations
similar to the instant case.

In Broadbent v. United States

Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 25 Utah 2d 430, 483 P.2d 894 (1971), a
physician believed that he may have treated his patient with too
much radiation, but gave no notice to his insurer of the incident.

Ten years later, the patient filed suit against the doc-

tor.

The insurer sought to avoid coverage on grounds that it did

not receive timely notice of the earlier incident.

Although the

Utah Supreme Court found that the insurer was liable under the
policy, it did so on grounds that because "the practice of medicine is not an exact science11 the physician could not have been
"aware of any alleged injury covered" over the course of the
patient's treatment.

On the other hand, the court noted that an

insured should be required to give notice when "it should be
obvious to him that he has caused harm . . . and that a claim is
likely to be made against him."
895-896.

JLcl. at 433-434, 483 P.2d at

The Broadbent opinion distinguished the fact situation

in that case from cases relating to notice "after the occurrence
of a specific event, such as the death of an insured, an injury
to one's person, a loss by a fire or theft, or a collision between cars."

Id., at 433, 483 P.2d at 896.

The present case falls within the rule stated in the
Broadbent opinion because it deals with a "specific event."
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If

the alleged damage to the property adjoining Quailbrook did not
make it obvious to appellant that it had caused harm and that a
claim was likely to be made against it, the prior lawsuit against
appellant must have been the sort of identifiable event that the
Broadbent court found would be reason to require notice.

At

the very least, the Broadbent decision means that a lawsuit
against an insured constitutes a "specific event" that would
require notice to the insurer under a policy that made notice a
condition precedent to indemnification.

Failure to give that

notice constitutes breach of the terms of the policy.
Although the Broadbent opinion did not discuss specifically whether a showing of prejudice would be necessary to avoid
liability in cases of late notice of a "specific event," it cited
as authority Sohm v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 352 F.2d 65
(6th Cir. 1965).

The Sohm case held that failure to supply writ-

ten notice "as soon as practicable" was a simple breach of the
policy provisions and absolved the insurer of any liability.

In

so holding, the Sohm court found that prejudice to the insurer
was irrelevant, stating:
The inquiry into whether the appellee was
prejudiced by the delay is irrelevant for
if the giving of notice was a condition
precedent to the right of recovery, [the
insured's] failure to give it prevented any
liability from attaching. I_d. at 69.
The policy behind strict enforcement of notice provisions is sound.

Encouraging prompt notice gives the insurer an

opportunity to make a timely and adequate investigation of all the
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circumstances, prevents collusion between the insured and the person claiming damages, promotes judicial economy, counters the ill
effects of witnesses1 lapse of memory, and promotes early compromise and settlement.
(1981).

Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice §4731

Defending actions without the expertise and resources

available to an insurer can lead to higher liability and harm to
the general public through higher premiums.

The court in Boston

Ins. Co. v. Ilalone, 269 F.Supp. 19 (N.D.Tex. 1966), aff'd 378
F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1967), observed:
A public liability insurance company could
hardly exist on reasonable premiums if its
opportunity to investigate and settle
possible claims in the early stages was
dependent upon the biased judgment of their
insureds on questions of that nature. Id.
at 21 .
Furthermore, requiring an insurer to show prejudice as a
result of late notice means requiring it to prove that a witness
may have remembered something he no longer remembers or that a
piece of evidence that once existed has since disappeared.
extreme weight of this burden is obvious:
What the insurer would have discovered had
it been given timely notice, and been able
to conduct a prompt investigation or had it
been given cooperation is problematical; it
will generally have no more information at
the time of the proceeding brought against
it under the policy than it had at the time
of the tort action. Thus, any evaluation by
court or jury as to the prejudicial effect
of the non-compliance must be entirely conjectural. Similar imponderables arise when
the assured fails to notify the insurer of
an impending court action. . . . 68 Harv.
L.Rev. 260 (1970).
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The

The inequity of subjecting Royal to such a burden as a
result of the appellant's breach of the notice provision of the
insurance contract is readily apparent.
The district court was correct in granting Royal's
motion for summary judgment without requiring a showing of prejudice to Royal as a result of appellant's late notice under the
facts of this case.

Where the insured gives notice of potential

liability under a policy five years after the event giving rise
to that liability, and two years after service of process in the
lawsuit concerning that liability, and after an unfavorable
judgment, where there is nothing on the record to suggest any
excuse or justification, the insured has breached the conditions
of that policy and the insurer is not liable under the terms of
the insurance contract.
POINT II.
APPELLANT HAS NO RIGHT OF INDEMNIFICATION
FROM DEFENDANT ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
In the prior action, the record is clear that
"Quailbrook Condominium Company11 was the entity substituted as
the defendant in that lawsuit.

The named insured in the Royal

policy was Busch Development, Inc.

"Busch-Quailbrook, a Ltd.

Partnership11 is one of several additional named insureds whose
name comes closest to that of "Quailbrook Condominium Company,"
the entity against which judgment has been taken.

It is

undisputed that "Quailbrook Condominium Company" does not appear
as an insured or additional insured on the written policy.
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Based

on the undisputed record before it, the trial court properly
ruled that the prior judgment against Quailbrook Condominium
Company should not bind Royal Insurance on its coverage issued to
Busch-Quailbrook, a limited partnership.
The interpretation of an unambiguous written contract is
a question of law to be decided by the judge.

Morris v. Mountain

States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983).
In this case, the summary judgment entered by the
district court is supported by the undisputed facts on the
record that Quailbrook Condominium Company is not a named insured
under the Royal policy.

Appellant introduced no evidence before

the trial court to indicate that Royal had a duty to indemnify
Quailbrook Condominium Company, and as a matter of law, Royal had
no duty to assume the liability of an entity which there is no
evidence it ever undertook to insure.
CONCLUSION
Where on defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
district court had before it the undisputed material facts of
plaintiff's breach of the conditions for notice of claim and
notice of suit in the written insurance contract, as well as the
undisputed record that Quailbrook Condominium Company, defendant
in the prior action, was not a party to the insuring agreement,
and where plaintiffs offered nothing on the record for excuse or
justification, the summary judgment in favor of defendant Royal
Insurance should be affirmed.
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